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This study explores the effectiveness of the Marine 
Expeditionary Rifle Squad (MERS) in support of Distributed 
Operations in urban terrain.  The Marine Corps is 
evaluating the Distributed Operations concept as a solution 
to new threats posed in current operations.  In order to 
employ distributed tactics, a more effective and capable 
Marine Rifle Squad is needed.  The MERS concept seeks to 
increase the effectiveness of the current rifle squad, 
enabling smaller, more lethal, and more survivable units.  
Those issues are explored using agent-based modeling and 
data analysis.  The most significant finding is that the 
MERS must be evaluated as a system; factors cannot be 
analyzed in isolation.  The two factors that most affect 
the effectiveness are survivability and lethality.  
Maximizing these two factors leads to the lowest friendly 
casualties, highest enemy casualties, and highest 
probability of mission success.  Agent-based modeling 
provides the maximum flexibility and responsiveness 
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The Global War on Terrorism has introduced the United 
States to new threats that present new capabilities and 
that are dedicated to destroying our way of life.  Terror 
organizations have demonstrated the ability to utilize 
varying and adaptive tactics to inflict mental and physical 
casualties on the United States and its allies. 
In an effort to mitigate the new threats, the United 
States Armed Forces have begun to evaluate and employ 
organizational structures, and tactics, techniques, and 
procedures that vary from traditional concepts.  Once 
again, the infantryman has become the best solution to 
combat new threats that have applied tactics that reduce 
the capabilities of modern American combat power.  Ensuring 
the man on the ground is prepared to face the enemy will 
lead the United States to victory in the Global War on 
Terrorism.  “On today’s battlefield, with irregular 
warfare, victory quite often goes to those individuals who 
can do something faster, working inside the enemy’s 
decision cycle” (Hagee, May 2005).  The Marine 
Expeditionary Rifle Squad (MERS) will accomplish this.  The 
Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad is “that distributed close 
combat fighting capability embodied in the Marines Corps 
Infantry, to include everything worn, consumed, or carried 
for use in a tactical environment and that contributes to 
training” (Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division, 
December 2004).   
Key to evaluating the effectiveness of the MERS in an 
urban environment is the evaluation of the MERS as a 
system; the total effect of the physical assets of the MERS 
 xxii
must be taken into consideration.  A base scenario 
consisting of a MERS conducting a combat patrol in a small 
neighborhood of Fallujah (750 meters x 800 meters) was 
modeled utilizing the agent-based Map-Aware Non-Uniform 
Automata (MANA) model (Figure 1).  Critical areas of 
effectiveness explored were Lethality, Survivability, and 




Figure 1.   An aerial view of the modeled terrain (left)  
    and the MANA translated map (right). (Best  
    viewed in color) 
 
In order to explore as many different levels of these 
factors as possible, Marine Corps data farming (utilizing a 
Nearly-Orthogonal Latin Hypercube) and supercomputing 
capabilities were called upon.  This led to a final 
evaluation design of experiment consisting of 66 separate 
factor level combinations, allowing a wide range of levels 
to be explored in order to capture the most important ones. 
In analysis of the scenario, the most interesting and 
important result is that the MERS must be evaluated as a 
system; the interactions between factors identify the 
effects that are gained or lost in the presence of each 
other.  Two factors are identified as the most significant  
 xxiii
in affecting all of the measures of effectiveness (MOEs); 
survivability and lethality.  These two factors show the 
highest significance in all of the linear regressions and 
classification and regression trees.  
 
More insights are: 
• Mass (the number of agents in friendly or enemy 
units) is still significant.  Mass equates to 
more rifles in the fight, vice more targets on 
the ground.  Larger forces enable the MERS to 
kill more enemy and enable the enemy to reduce 
the ability of the MERS to accomplish the 
mission. 
• Situational Awareness is a double edged sword.  
In MANA, SA was modeled as the sharing of contact 
detection/classification in the MERS.  As each 
agent detected and shared information on 
contacts, fusion of two MERS agents detecting the 
same enemy agent allowed for ‘perfect’ SA 
management.  Nevertheless, multiple detections 
and fusions necessitates the model spend time 
prosecuting the current contacts vice detecting 
new ones.  This is akin to the real world problem 
of information overload.  A Marine that is trying 
to process too much information is a Marine that 
is not in the fight, which can end up as a dead 
Marine. 
 
Many of these insights appeal to the intuitiveness of 
Marines; given a survivable and lethal squad, the mission 
can be accomplished with high probability.  The research 
 xxiv
has quantified concepts that are held true by Marines 
today.  This in turn allows further analysis to be 
conducted, utilizing this new tool, in evaluation of the 
best course of action to ensure that our Marines are the 
best equipped and trained, most survivable and lethal force 
the enemy will ever face. 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. RESEARCH PLAN OF ATTACK 
1. Objectives of Research 
The primary objective of this research is to identify 
the key parameters influencing the effectiveness of the 
Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad (MERS).  As an infantry 
officer, the author is well versed in traditional tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs), as well as current 
threat TTPs.  The MERS concept represents a potential for 
increasing the overall capabilities of the infantryman.  
Evaluation of the MERS concept will be accomplished through 
the analysis of a MERS engaged in urban combat using an 
agent-based simulation.  An important aspect of the 
analysis will be to take into consideration the 
interactions between different parameters and different 
levels of each parameter.  Doing so will ensure that the 
squad is evaluated as an integrated system, the ultimate 
goal of the MERS concept.  
 
2. Use of Research 
This study presents information on techniques for 
better representing combatants in combat models, especially 
small unit land combat.  Agent-based modeling offers a 
relatively user friendly capability for analysis.  An added 
benefit will be to identify a suitable tool for use by the 
Marine Corps Systems Command in evaluating potential 
weapons and equipment for procurement.  Thorough analysis, 
utilizing the correct tools, will provide a sounding board 
for decisions on equipping our fighting forces. 
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3. Flow of Thesis 
The thesis begins with an introduction that discusses 
the environment of conflict in the world today, followed by 
discussion of the simulation used, a scenario overview, and 
a discussion of the measures of effectiveness.  It 
continues with a detailed discussion of the designs of 
experiment, the parameter settings used for data farming, 
and the final set of parameter values that were found to 
produce the most desirable results.  A detailed statistical 
and analytical evaluation utilizing traditional regression 
techniques, as well as regression trees (or partitions) are 
used to highlight interesting findings.  Finally, further 
courses of study are suggested in order to continue the 
analysis of small unit combat. 
 
B. BACKGROUND  
1. Mitigating New Threats in the Global War on 
Terrorism 
The Global War on Terrorism has introduced the United 
States to new threats that present new capabilities and 
that are dedicated to destroying our way of life.  Terror 
organizations have demonstrated the ability to utilize 
varying and adaptive tactics to inflict mental and physical 
casualties on the United States and its allies. 
The U.S. is engaged in a long-term global war of 
ideas, values  and interests, waged against an 
ill defined and ever changing enemy. This enemy 
is adaptive, committed to his cause, 
technologically and psychologically savvy, and 
thoroughly ruthless. (Marine Corps Future 
Operations Division, December 2004) 
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In an effort to mitigate the new threats, the United 
States Armed Forces have begun to evaluate and employ 
organizational structures, and tactics, techniques, and 
procedures that vary from traditional concepts.  Once 
again, the infantryman has become the best solution to 
combat new threats that have applied tactics that reduce 
the capabilities of modern American combat power.  Ensuring 
the man on the ground is prepared to face the enemy will 
lead the United States to victory in the Global War on 
Terrorism.  “On today’s battlefield, with irregular 
warfare, victory quite often goes to those individuals who 
can do something faster, working inside the enemy’s 
decision cycle” (Hagee, May 2005). 
 
2. Distributed Operations Defined  
The United States Marine Corps has seen the concept of 
Distributed Operations (DO) rise to the top of potentially 
effective options.  
[In order] to provide the capabilities Joint 
Force Commanders will need to meet the wide 
spectrum of challenges that our nation will face 
in the 21st Century… [w]e will continue to rely on 
our fundamental tenants of Expeditionary Maneuver 
Warfare and Combined-Arms Air-Ground Task Forces.  
We will enhance and expand these capabilities 
through the aggressive implementation of Sea-
Basing and Distributed Operations. (Hagee, April 
2005) 
Distributed Operations are “those military operations 
which entail the intelligence driven, decentralized 
application of networked and fully integrated combined arms 
maneuver forces, alternatively dispersing and aggregating 
over extended distances, to observe, target, influence, 
dislocate, defeat, or destroy traditional and non-
4 
traditional threats” (Marine Corps Future Operations 
Division, December 2004).  The Marine Corps believes DO 
“greatly expands current force capabilities in joint, 
combined, and interagency operations across the full range 
of military operations” (Marine Corps Future Operations 
Division, December 2004). 
Distributed forces present complexity to the 
enemy…  Complexity  induces confusion and 
ambiguity in the opponent and produces a 
competitive advantage for our forces… The 
adversary is further disrupted by combined arms 
or multidimensional attacks.  (Schmiddle and 
Hoffman, Sept 2004) 
DO contains several key characterizations; “Marine 
centric, decentralization, complexity, multi-
dimensionality, simultaneity, adaptability, and continuous 
pressure” (Marine Corps Future Operations Division, December 
2004).  DO will allow the Marine Corps to adapt to new 
threats and leverage current capabilities to more 
effectively engage the enemy.  In Distributed Operations, 
the infantry squad will serve as the base unit, and its 
capabilities must reflect the need of increased 
decentralization and self-sustainability (in a combat and 
logistical sense).   
Implementation of Distributed Operations as an 
extension of maneuver warfare will require a 
focus on enhanced small units: more autonomous, 
more lethal, and better able to operate across 
the full spectrum of operations.  This will 
require investing in the technologies and 
training that will provide individual 
communications, tactical mobility, and networked 
intelligence down to the squad level.  Our 
logistics and fires capabilities must be adaptive 
and scalable in order to support these small 
units, whether dispersed across the battle space 
5 
or aggregated for larger operations. (Hagee, 
April 2005) 
Realizing the need for an infantry squad with improved 
capabilities, the concept of the Marine Expeditionary Rifle 
Squad was developed. 
 
3. The Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad in Support of 
Distributed Operations 
The Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad (MERS) is “that 
distributed close combat fighting capability embodied in 
the Marines Corps Infantry, to include everything worn, 
consumed, or carried for use in a tactical environment and 
that contributes to training” (Marine Corps Studies and 
Analysis Division, December 2004).  The MERS concept is to 
be used to help identify capabilities that are important 
for the conduct of Distributed Operations.  The goal of the 
MERS concept is to “man, train, organize, provide current 
doctrine, lead and equip the Marine Infantry Rifle Squad in 
an integrated, holistic and systematic fashion that 
increases the overall fighting ability of the entire unit 
across the spectrum of its missions” (Carlson, April 2004).  
These capabilities are primarily physical and tangible in 
nature; an improved weapon, lighter body armor, etc.  The 
Marine Corps is evaluating current production options, as 
well as procurement of future systems.  The MERS will 
retain all of the current functionality of a traditional 
Marine infantry squad.  The new integrated concept will 





4. The Squad as a System 
An important aspect of the MERS concept is the idea 
that the squad be treated as a system in the evaluation of 
its performance and mission accomplishment.  This allows a 
better evaluation of the combined effects of the 
introduction of new weapons and equipment; the unit’s 
effectiveness is better represented for evaluation rather 
than aggregating the individual members of the squad’s 
effectiveness.  Current Marine Corps doctrine and table of 
organization (T/O) specifies the framework for a standard 
Marine infantry squad (Figure 1): 
• 1 Squad Leader  
• 3 Fire Team Leaders 
• 3 Automatic Riflemen 
• 3 Assistant Automatic Riflemen 
• 3 Riflemen 
All Marines are similarly equipped (table of equipment 
(T/E)) based on their billet assignment.  This allows for 





Figure 1.   Current Marine Rifle Squad organization (T/O) 
(Fleet Marine Force Manual 6-5) 
 
The standard tactics used to close with and destroy 
the enemy revolve around the principle of fire and 
maneuver.  Fire and maneuver consists of a group of Marines 
engaging the enemy, using various weapons as the situation 
dictates, in order to gain combined arms effects, while 
another group moves to close with the enemy.  Fire and 
maneuver consists of a specified sub-unit (e.g., Fire Team) 
fixing or suppressing the enemy while the other units 
maneuver to close with the enemy. 
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The MERS will be evaluated based on the same T/O as 
the current structure, but will employ varied tactics, 
techniques, and procedures in order to support Distributed 
Operations.  This may result in the MERS operating 
aggregated, disaggregated, or reinforced (with additional 
external assets, e.g., Civil Affairs Teams). 
In support of Distributed Operations, the MERS may be 
required to conduct ‘swarming’ tactics in which it will 
maneuver asymmetrically with other networked MERS in order 
to disrupt, fix, and destroy the enemy.  It may be required 
to aggregate into a larger unit in order to apply a massed 
force at a decisive point against a fixed enemy.  Likewise, 
it may just as easily be required to operate disaggregated, 
providing surveillance of critical areas and threats.  All 





















II. MODEL, SCENARIOS, AND MEASURES 
In order to answer research questions, analysts have 
many tools at their disposal.  An effective set of tools 
are combat models, particularly agent-based models.  As 
with any model, scenarios must be well developed and 
parameter settings must be understandable and practical.  
Finally, the analysis cannot begin until measures are 
developed that can provide insights into the results.  The 
combination of these three things lays the foundation for 
quality analysis. 
   
A. AGENT-BASED MODELING: MAP-AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA 
(MANA) 
The Map-Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) is an agent-
based model developed by David Galligan, Michael Lauren, 
and Mark Anderson of the New Zealand Defence Force (MANA 
User Manual, 2004).  The model was developed to overcome 
shortfalls of past complex adaptive system (CAS) and agent-
based models.  In the past, many of these models were 
dismissed because they did not have a strongly physics-
based approach to modeling.  The developers of MANA believe 
differently: 
 
The history of physics has been characterised by 
the search for systems simple enough to be able 
to be described with a high degree of accuracy by 
mathematical equations. Isaac Newton’s laws of 
motion are an example. Although extremely 
accurate at predicting, for example, the path and 
distance traveled by a heavy projectile, they 
cannot in general be relied on. If the projectile 
is light, it then becomes subject to a far 
greater degree to the viscous drag of the 
atmosphere, which makes the original calculations 
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invalid. These equations cannot with complete 
generality be simply or easily “corrected” for 
the action of the drag. The reason is that the 
interaction between the viscous atmosphere and 
the projectile is just too complicated and 
dependent on too many variables (particularly if 
the projectile is light and has irregular shape, 
like a feather), not to mention that the 
atmosphere itself is unpredictable and turbulent.  
This simple example illustrates a powerful point: 
the world is far more complicated than Newton’s 
equations. To this day, there exists no set of 
equations that can with absolute certainty 
predict the evolution of the vast majority of 
phenomena we see in everyday life for any 
significant period into the future.  Therefore, 
to rely on models built “on a bedrock of physics” 
is to deceive ourselves. It is a myth that a more 
detailed model is necessarily a better model, 
because it is impossible to capture accurately 
every aspect of nature. In fact, the more 
detailed a model is, the more obscure its 
workings, a problem that is compounded if the 
user is not the model designer. (MANA User 
Manual) 
The author expended much effort in order to select the 
best tool to evaluate MERS capabilities.  This included 
evaluating other agent-based models (Pythagoras and 
Einstein), as well as an on-site evaluation of the next 
generation physics-based model, Combat XXI.  In the end, 
there was no competition between MANA and the other models.  
Each model has nice features, but none possess the complete 







A modeler can take advantage of MANA’s easy setup and 
short run times to explore a vast space of parameter 
values.  Combining this with designs of experiments 
utilizing nearly-orthogonal Latin hypercubes produces 
results that allow magnitudes more parameters to be 
evaluated than is feasible with other legacy combat 
simulations.  
MANA has three capabilities that set it apart from 
other models: 
• The agents are “map-aware”; they know where they 
are in relation to things around them and 
remember information such as where an enemy 
contact last took place. 
• The model is events-based; occurrences of an 
event, such as detection, trigger a state change 
that can have state-specific behaviors and 
characteristics. 
• The model is user friendly; it requires minimal 
experience to begin use and is flexible enough to 
create scenarios and gain insights in a fraction 
of the time needed for other models. 
 
As an agent-based model, an important capability is to 
model behavioral interactions between agents.  This allows 
complex relationships to be well modeled.  This is 
strongest in small unit combat, an area that has 
traditionally been difficult to model utilizing larger 
physics-based models.  The author established a well 
defined personality for each subunit modeled in MANA 
through personal experience and discussion with military 
peers.  After the personalities are defined, the user has 
the ability to tailor the environment, mission, goals, etc. 
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to evaluate multiple options.  With the correctly modeled 
personality, the tactics and relationship rules will be 
applicable to any scenario, in whole or with minor 
adjustments. 
 
B. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
1. The Story 
Current combat operations have highlighted the need 
for highly-trained, well-equipped, decentralized small 
units that can adapt quickly to an ever changing situation.  
These units need to be able to employ lethal organic fires 
as well as direct precision inorganic assets.  They need to 
be able to overpower enemy forces that may outnumber them 
and exploit fleeting opportunities as they arise.   
This type of combat was indicative of Operation Al 
Fajr, the Battle of Fallujah, which took place during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Due to the urban environment and 
disaggregated enemy hiding within it, United States and 
coalition forces were reduced to small unit combat.  Given 
this characterization, the author suggests that Operation 
Al Fajr is an example where both concepts of MERS and DO 
may have been well employed.  “Depending on the sector [in 
Fallujah] searched, the individual squad engaged in 8 to 24 
close quarters firefights over an 8-day period, and none 
flinched”(West, July 2005).  
The base scenario modeled revolves around a MERS 
conducting a combat patrol in an urban environment (a small 
neighborhood of Fallujah (Figure 2) (750 meters x 800 




Figure 2.   Overhead imagery of modeled terrain 
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The squad is modeled as a single unit that has intra-
squad communication and a shared situational awareness.  
There is no external input from inorganic assets, such as 
reconnaissance teams, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), etc. 
Important to analysis of the MERS is their ability to 
utilize inorganic fires (artillery, close air support, 
etc.) in order to accomplish the mission.  A scenario 
utilizing external support, modeled as an indirect fire 
unit, was also briefly explored, but requires more in depth 
analysis.    
There are several key factors that are of interest to 
the evaluation of the MERS; command and control (C2), 
lethality, mobility, survivability, sustainability, and 
training (Figure 3).  The MERS concept looks to increase 
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Figure 3.   The six factors that compose the squad as an 




This thesis explores the outcomes of increasing 
capabilities, decreasing limitations, and the trade-offs 
between them, in the specified scenario.  This is 
accomplished by utilization of agent-based modeling in 
order to identify the key factors that affect the overall 
effectiveness of the Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad in 
support of Distributed Operations in urban operations. 
Critical areas of evaluation to be explored are Lethality, 
Survivability, and Situational Awareness (SA) (C2).  Along 
with evaluation of the aforementioned critical areas is the 
development of Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) in order to 
continue to improve the analysis of the MERS. 
   
a. Force Size 
As evident by the title, the focus of this work 
is at the squad level (9 to 21 Marines, dependant on 
attachments and detachments).  That being said, based on 
the concept that larger scale combat is an aggregation of 
smaller scale combat, this work may be applicable to larger 
units.  As an infantryman, the author has long understood 
that in order to have effective and efficient platoons and 
companies, the squads must be trained to the highest of 
standards.  Modeling and analysis of units above squad 
level is feasible, once the behaviors and characteristics 
are well defined at the squad level (see Chapter II, 





The enemy force is based on a similarly sized 
unit to the Marine unit.  An important area of evaluation 
is the ability of the MERS to deal with a much larger enemy 
unit than their squad (75-100% larger than the MERS; this 
situation is explored through data farming). 
 
b. Force Compositions 
Both the MERS and the enemy unit are similarly 
equipped as light infantry forces (essentially restricted 
to the equipment that can be physically carried by the 
individual).  This keeps a level playing field baseline for 
evaluation. 
The traditional Marine infantry squad has an 
organization based on three fire teams (Figure 1).  The 
modeled MERS is based on this concept.  The enemy forces 
are randomly distributed between 3 pre-selected positions 
on the MERS’ patrol route (Figure 4).  This results in the 
MERS randomly engaging a large enemy concentration or 










Figure 4.   The distribution of enemy forces in the 
scenario.  The top picture shows an evenly 
distributed enemy.  The bottom picture shows 
larger concentrations of enemy (terrain is 750 











c. Force Capabilities 
As stated in Force Compositions, both friendly 
and enemy forces are considered to be light infantry.  This 
limits their capabilities to man-portable equipment.  They 
are both equipped with direct-fire kinetic-energy weapons 
(rifles).  The only organic sensor assets can be considered 
to be optical (based on line-of-sight (LOS), e.g., human 
vision or vision assistance tools such as a rifle combat 
optic (RCO)).  The MERS has the capability to maintain 
intra-squad communications, which increases their SA.  The 
enemy force is restricted to agent SA.  The forces are 
foot-mobile with no external support (mobility or fires). 
Survivability, or the ability to defeat enemy fires, either 
through direct factors (anti-penetration) or indirect 
(ability to not be detected and engaged), is implicitly 
modeled through a combination of model specific parameters 
(there is no well defined “body armor” factor in MANA). 
 
d. Terrain 
The terrain chosen for this modeling and analysis 
is an urban neighborhood (akin to a suburb) of Fallujah, 
Iraq (Figure 2).  The area is characterized by one- and 
two-story, mud-brick constructed houses and shops.  This 
type of environment is one that has begun to dominate 
conflicts in the world today. 
The buildings are primarily built flush with the 
streets; the only open areas around the buildings are small 
walled-in courtyards.  This became a hampering point during 
Operation Al Fajr.  Friendly forces were forced to maneuver 
the streets and breach the walls that lined them in order 




Figure 5.   Marines take up positions along a narrow street 
in Fallujah. (Photo Credit: Luis Sinco, Los 
Angeles Times) 
 
Another key aspect of the terrain is the presence 
of micro-terrain, the natural and man-made clutter that 
fills the areas around larger terrain features.  In the 
infantry, a common saying is that six inches can save your 
life; six inches of micro-terrain can keep a bullet from 
reaching you.  Fallujah had been sufficiently rubbled by 
the time of the attack during OIF (Figure 6).  This left 
many piles of bricks, trash, etc. that could be utilized 





Figure 6.   1st Division Marines on the move in western 
Fallujah. (photo credit Associated Press]  
 
This is modeled in MANA through the use of the 
elevation map feature.  By introducing randomly distributed 
pixels of white space (translated in MANA as infinite 
elevation), the effect of added noise can be introduced 




Figure 7.   Elevation map utilized to add noise to LOS 
calculations in order to simulate rubble; white 
space is evaluated as infinite elevation in 
MANA; therefore, if there is white space 
between two agents, they will not detect one 
another. (Best viewed in color) 
 
MANA utilizes different color combinations to 
delineate restrictions on LOS, movement rates, and 
elevation.  MANA evaluates the percentage associated with 
each color hue during the prosecution of detection and 
classification; the value affects the probability of each.  
In this model, a gray feature represents terrain 
(buildings) that is impassable to movement and LOS; that 
is, the agent cannot move through walls and they provide 
perfect cover and concealment.  The olive green hue 
represents rubbled areas that result in reduced movement 
speeds and added concealment and cover (60% movement rate, 
20% cover, and 50% concealment—all compared to zero 
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restricted terrain).  The regular green color represents 
semi-rubbled streets (80% movement rate, 10% cover, and 20% 
concealment).  These effects are evaluated each time step 
(i.e., every two seconds). 
 
3. Modeling Limitations 
MANA is an excellent tool for modeling complex 
adaptive systems (CAS), especially small unit combat (see 
II. Model, Scenarios, and Measures, A. Agent-Based 
Modeling: Map-Aware Non-uniform Automata).  Of course, it 
is not without its limitations.  The biggest limitation in 
modeling revolves around the ability for the units to 
provide standard tactical responses (in the form of 
maneuver and fire) to situations.  For example; when 
confronted with an enemy force that is engaging the front 
of a column formation, traditional tactics would dictate 
the rear sub-units to flank and provide suppressive fires 
on the enemy in order to allow the engaged portion of the 
column to maneuver to cover or against the enemy.  In MANA, 
when a part of the unit is engaged, the rest of the agents 
become aware of the situational map and begin to maneuver 
based on their predetermined behaviors.  This may result in 
the aforementioned behavior of flanking and suppressing, or 
it may result in some subunits maneuvering past the enemy 
in order to continue on the mission.   
Though this may be listed as a limitation, it is truly 
a desirable effect because it may result in the observance 
of emergent behavior by the agents—that is, the agents may 
recognize the situation and find a solution to the problem, 
based on the pre-defined behaviors (see Chapter IV, B. 
Insights, 4. Emergent Behavior).  
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Another set of limitations lies in the actual settings 
of the model.  It may be desirable in some cases to have 
the ability to “dial in” a value, say the anti-penetration 
capabilities of body armor, for example.  Instead, the 
modeler is forced to utilize several surrogate methods to 
capture the desired measures; for example, enemy PK as a 
surrogate for friendly body armor effectiveness.  This 
allows MANA to be applied to much broader analyses rather 
than only being able to model combat.  
MANA utilizes a grey scale in order to define 
elevation.  The author modeled elevation, or the effects 
of, by the use of controlling movement, cover, and 
concealment rates.  This approach allowed for more control 
in the scenario.  This does not allow an agent to occupy an 
elevation higher than the other agents. 
     
4. Modeling Assumptions 
In the evaluation of the proper tool to utilize, the 
author was subject to many discussions on the topic that 
agent-based models are subject to too many assumptions.  As 
with any model, assumptions are necessary.   
The key assumptions in the scenario modeled revolve 
around an aggregation and simplification of capabilities 
and limitations.  For all agents in the model, they are 
considered to be similarly equipped with a single, direct-
fire, kinetic-energy weapon (e.g., a rifle).  They have a 
single, LOS-based, optical sensor (e.g., human vision or a 
vision assistance tool).  The time step of the model is 2 
seconds per time step.  Based on an assumed average two 
hour mission, the average seconds would be 7200.  In order 
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to allow for longer missions, the author divided 7200 by 2, 
converting to an average number of time steps of 3600.   
The ability of agents to be detected (stealth factor 
in MANA) is utilized several ways.  When an agent is fired 
upon, they have the ability to assume a position that 
presents less of a target to their adversary (e.g., the 
prone).  This is modeled through increasing their stealth 
value.  Stealth is also used to capture the ability of 
agents to remain undetected overall.  This may be analyzed 
as increased training that allows for agents to move with 
less probability of detection or a lower signature due to 
better camouflage.  The important fact is weather or not 
stealth as a factor increases the overall effectiveness of 
the agents.  If stealth does increase effectiveness, the 
question becomes how best to do this given the various 
options. 
The max effective range of engagement in the model is 
assumed to be 300 meters.  This is more than enough 
distance, especially in an urban environment.  The 
Probability of Kill (PK) is varied within this range, with 
initial settings of 0.3, and is considered to be zero 
outside of 300 meters. 
The model makes use of Detection Range, Classification 
Range, and Probability of Classification (PC) in a unique 
way in order to allow easier data farming.  The Detection 
range is 1000 meters, allowing the agents to ‘view’ the 
entire battle space and the Classification Range is 100 
meters with an accompanying PC.  This is a practical 
assumption in urban operations.  The initial PC is set to 
be 0.5 from 0 to 100 meters, and 0 beyond 100 meters.  In 
this arrangement, PC is dependant on detection; it may be 
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viewed as probability to classify given detection is 0.5 
from 0 to 100 meters.  In the author’s experience, 
detections are much less difficult than classification, 
especially in an urban environment. 
The final assumption of the model deals with the time 
that a contact stays active in the agent’s/squad’s SA map.  
It is assumed that after 150 time steps (150 time steps = 5 
minutes), the contact will fall off the SA map.  So, based 
on the fact that the clock starts each time there is a 
contact, if a contact disappears from the SA map after 5 
minutes, the squad has most likely moved beyond the 





One of the goals of this research is to identify 
potential measures of effectiveness for use in modeling the 
MERS and DO overall.  Traditional measures have dealt with 
odd calculations and exact values; speed of completion, 
increased contact gains, less friendly casualties, etc.  
While these are important and useful values, evaluating 
more general measures, such as the ability of the modeled 
unit to accomplish the mission and to kill enemy forces 
while protecting friendly forces may be more important— 
especially in the agent-based simulation environment.  
Often, various settings and values used in agent 
simulations do not translate well to the real world.  The 
analysis of the results (e.g., trends) is more important 
than the specified numbers. 
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MOEs also need to appeal to the warfighting 
intuitiveness in all Marines.  They need to measure the 
fact that Marines are concerned with combat; killing the 
enemy, protecting Marines’ lives, and accomplishing the 
mission.  Ensuring that these tenets are followed allows 
for a better evaluation and for the simulation to gain 
validity in the eyes of warfighters. 
 
2. Measures Utilized 
a. Exchange Ratio 
The Exchange Ratio is calculated as ratio of the 
proportion of casualties (number of casualties divided by 







Figure 8.   Exchange Ratio calculation. 
 
The exchange ratio allows for a practical 
evaluation of the trade-off between friendly and enemy 
forces.  Large values of the exchange ratio are desirable 
(high enemy casualties divided by low friendly casualties). 
 
b. Probability (Friendly Mission Completion) 
Mission completion is reached only if two 
conditions are met; (1) the percentage of friendly 
27 
casualties is below one-third and (2) the friendly unit 
reaches the goal.  In MANA, if any member of the squad 
reaches the goal it is recorded as a success.  In this 
analysis, only a unit that is still combat effective (two-
thirds intact) when the goal is reached is counted as a 
success.  This negates the chance that a lone survivor 
reaches the goal and the mission is recorded as a success.   
 
c. Proportion Friendly and Proportion Enemy 
Casualties 
These two measures are examples of exact values 
that are of interest in the analysis.  The proportion of 
forces that result in casualties is a metric that 
translates well into an easily evaluated number.  It also 
falls into the category of measures that take a macro view 
of the simulation, desirable in the analysis. 
 
d. Time to Mission Completion 
This measure is used to evaluate the increased or 
decreased effectiveness of the MERS.  If one assumes that 
an increase in capabilities of the MERS should relate to a 
decrease in mission length, then the time to mission 
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III. DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
The parameters selected to evaluate are based on the 
concept that the MERS will provide increased effectiveness 
through better weapons, communication equipment, 
situational awareness, etc.  As with many simulations, 
there are not always well defined real-world-to-model 
parameters.  This requires simulation parameters to be 
defined in order to provide insights to the modeling 
question.   
It is also important to explore a wide range of values 
in order to have a better chance of capturing significant 
ranges.  This need requires good designs of experiments and 
utilization of supercomputer facilities in order to data 
farm. 
 
1. Parameters Explored 
a. MERS_stealth (Survivability) 
This is the single step probability of no 
detection by an enemy within detection range.  There is a 
cumulative probability effect; that is, the more 
opportunities the enemy has to detect an agent, the more 
likely it is that he will.  The parameter may be varied 
from 0 to 100, but is only varied from 10 to 90 (allowing 
for a realistic range of concealment). 
 
b. MERS_numAgents 
The MERS concept, in support of DO, proposes that 
units will be tasked organized to fit missions.  This 
parameter is based on the standard 13 man squad, but varied 
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based on the possibility of detaching a 4 man team, or 
attaching up to two 4 man teams (resulting in anywhere from 
9 to 21 Marines in the squad). 
 
c. Enemy_numAgents 
It is important that the MERS be able to defeat 
enemy forces that range from small units (5 agents) to 
larger units (20 agents).  The MERS must also be able to 
defeat enemy units that are large compared to the number of 
agents in the MERS. 
 
d. MERS_commsDelay (Situational Awareness (C2)) 
This is the intra-squad delay of information 
sharing or situational awareness of the agents in the 
squad, by time step.  It is varied from zero delay to a 
five minute delay; an enormous value given that a typical 
squad would only have a footprint of 100 meters x 100  
meters on the ground in urban terrain, but allows for full 
evaluation of the importance of this parameter. 
 
e. MERS_taken_shot_duration 
This is the state duration utilized to model time 
between shots fired at targets.  This technique is used 
because it is much simpler and more intuitive than the MANA 
variable of “firing rate”.   
This parameter may be used as a surrogate for 
several sources of improved effectiveness.  It may be 
argued that the improved training that the MERS and DO 
units receive leads to the ability of the Marine to engage 
more targets at a faster rate.  Improved equipment that 
allows for better target selection and engagement may also 
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be surrogated by this parameter.  The range of evaluation 
is from 2 seconds to 90 seconds.  Again, a broad range of 
possibilities is explored. 
 
f. MERS_shot_at_duration 
This is the state duration of the state entered 
when an individual MERS agent is shot at by an enemy agent.  
It models the ability of a Marine to get back in the fight.  
As is the case with the previous parameter, this parameter 
may be used as a surrogate for improved training or 




This is the state duration when a member of squad 
is fired upon.  It models the squad’s reaction to enemy 
fire and ability to get back into action.  This parameter 
can surrogate the common SA of the squad, improved 
training, or improved weapons.  The range of evaluation is 
from 30 seconds to 5 minutes. 
 
h. Enemy_PK (Survivability) 
This is the single shot Probability of Hit/Kill 
(SSPK).  In this model, it is used as a surrogate for MERS 
survivability; lower enemy PK = higher MERS survivability.  
It can be used to highlight the need for better body armor, 
protection, etc., or the need for a better ability of the 
squad to avoid being engaged by the enemy (through 




i. MERS_PK (Lethality) 
This is modeled as a typical SSPK.  It should be 
noted that a real-world-to-model translation of this PK is 
not a practical thing; it is much better to evaluate the 
importance of lethality in general.  
  
j. MERS_Pdet_class (Situational Awareness (C2)) 
This is the Probability of Detection and 
Classification, which is a simultaneous event in this 
model.  This parameter may be viewed as a surrogate for 
sensor capabilities in whole.  In the scenario, detection 
occurs at an infinite range, given a LOS, and 
classification (friend, enemy, neutral) may occur at less 
than 100 meters.  In MANA, only PC is modified.  This 
arrangement allows classification to be surrogated for 
detection. 
   
2. Nearly-Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes 
Nearly-Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (NOLH) are a method 
of designing the parameter combinations and values in order 
to gain nearly orthogonal correlations between parameters 
that are varied (Cioppa, 2002).  This allows the evaluation 
of main effects and interactions of parameters.  The 
greatest benefit of the NOLH is that the necessary number 
of excursions (different parameter combinations) needed in 
order to properly fill the parameter space is orders of 
magnitude smaller than traditional designs, such as a dense 
grid.  This in turn allows more replications to be 
executed, with varied random seeds, in order to add to the 
statistical significance of the analysis. 
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Based on the 10 parameters evaluated, only 33 
excursions are needed to gain an adequate space filling 
design.  In order to increase the fidelity of the results, 
66 excursions are used, with 30 replications at each 
excursion (Appendix C).  The data is then summarized as 
means for each excursion and analytical techniques are 
applied to see the relationships between the parameters 
explored and the MOEs. 
 
3. Data Farming and Supercomputing 
Paramount to identifying key factors in the 
effectiveness of the MERS is the utilization of Data 
Farming.  This concept, hand-in-hand with supercomputing 
capabilities, allows for wide ranges of parameter values to 
be explored.  This allows them to be narrowed down to 
smaller sets of influential values.  Identifying 
influential ranges of parameter values then allows for a 
better application of the NOLH design in order to identify 
important effects and interactions.  Data Farming prepares 
the ground in order to grow interesting outcomes. 
  
B. METHODOLOGY INSIGHTS 
In developing a good set of behaviors and a realistic 
scenario, many scenario revisions were utilized.  With each 
revision, the author became more proficient with the tools 
available and with creating a scenario that allowed for the 
best evaluation of the capabilities of the MERS.  In this 
process, several insights were gained.   First, initial 
scenario executions necessitated unrealistically low values 
for PK (based on the desire to at least provide some real-
world-to-model translation).  These early scenarios 
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utilized very basic behavioral rules and agent 
interactions.  They were not much more than establishing a 
goal and pressing go.  As the behaviors became better 
developed, and a detailed events-based evaluation was 
conducted on agent-interactions (with complimentary state 
changes), the need arose for a more realistic modeling of 
PK (resulting in a 30% PK at 300 meters as a baseline).  
This was a very interesting outcome.  Overall, as the model 
became more realistic the values of parameters gravitated 
to reality as well. 
Second, the development of adequate surrogate measures 
was vital to gaining insights into the modeling of small 
unit combat.  As with any model, perfect real-world-to-
model translations of values are difficult to capture.  The 
use of surrogates enables the analyst to gain insights 
nevertheless (see example, III. Design, Methodology, and 
Data Analysis, A. Design of Experiment, 2. Parameters 
Explored, h. Enemy_PK). 
Last, agent-based models pose new challenges in 
balancing emergent behaviors and adequate scripting of the 
scenario.  The analyst must be willing to accept less 
control over the model (e.g., routes and engagement 








IV. DATA ANALYSIS  
A. OVERVIEW 
In conducting the analysis of the results, the author 
focused on techniques that would help identify overarching 
statistical trends.  This is primarily accomplished through 
the use of regression trees, or partitions.  The 
statistical package JMP 5.1 discusses partition as follows: 
 
The Partition platform recursively partitions 
data according to a relationship between the X 
and Y values, creating a tree of partitions. 
Variations of this technique go by many names and 
brand names: decision trees, CARTTM, CHAIDTM, C4.5, 
C5, and others. The technique is often taught as 
a data mining technique, because 
• it is good for exploring relationships 
without having a good prior model  
• it handles large problems easily, and  
• the results are very interpretable.  
 
The factor columns (X’s) can be either continuous 
or categorical (nominal or ordinal). If an X is 
continuous, then the splits (partitions) are 
created by a cutting value. The sample is divided 
into values below and above this cutting value. 
If the X is categorical, then the sample is 
divided into two groups of levels.  
The response column (Y) can also be either 
continuous or categorical (nominal or ordinal). 
If Y is continuous, then the platform fits means, 
and creates splits which most significantly 
separate the means by examining the sums of 
squares due to the means differences. If Y is 
categorical, then the response rates (the 
estimated probability for each response level) 
become the fitted value, and the most significant 
split is determined by the largest likelihood-
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ratio chi-square statistic. In either case, the 
split is chosen to maximize the difference in the 
responses between the two branches of the split.  
(JMP Start Statistics, 3rd Edition) 
 
The ability of the partition to be interpretable is 
most important.  This allows for the modeler to easily 
explain the results to decision makers. 
Traditional Least Squared Error (LSE) Regression is 
used to compliment the partition.  Akaike’s Information 
Criteria (AIC) is used to select influential parameters, 
followed by the LSE regression.  AIC is a stepwise 
heuristic that identifies the best values through the 
computation of the AIC value (Figure 9). 
 
ln 2SSEAIC n p
n
⎛ ⎞
= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 
Figure 9.   Calculation of AIC statistic. SSE is the sum of 
squared errors between the observed and 
predicted values, n is the number of 
observations, and p is the number of model 
parameters including the intercept.  The model 
with the lowest AIC is considered best. (JMP 
Start Statistics, 3rd Edition) 
 
 
B. METHODOLOGY EXAMPLE: PROPORTION FRIENDLY CASUALTIES 
A good example of the methodology utilized is with the 
MOE of Proportion of Friendly Casualties.  All of the 
parameters (main effects), two-way interactions, and 
quadratic terms are entered into the Stepwise Regression 
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procedure.   The threshold for deciding whether a term 
under investigation is included or removed from the model 
is set at the 0.10 significance level.  The goal is to 
create a model that produces the best R Squared value.  R 
Squared is the percent of variation the model explains, or 
how well the model fits; the higher the better.  The 
Stepwise algorithm evaluates whether or not including or 
removing the term improves the R Squared value, based on 
the AIC statistic.  Once the Stepwise algorithm has reached 
the best R Squared possible, the analyst has the option of 
creating a model for evaluation with LSE Regression that 
contains all of the recommended terms from the Stepwise 
Regression or a user-defined model. 
The full model explored after the Stepwise Regression 
procedure is a 14 parameter model that displays many 































Figure 10.   Model equation for full 14 parameter model of 
Proportion of Friendly Casualties.  Note the 
multiple interaction terms included.  The model 
R Squared value is 0.9485. 
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The overall fit of the model is 0.9485 (Table 1). 
 
Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.948545 
RSquare Adj 0.935681 
Root Mean Square Error 0.076481 
Mean of Response 0.614596 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 66 
 
Table 1.   Table displays the fit of the full model. 
 
The associated parameter estimates and significance levels 
are seen below (Table 2). 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 0.812676 0.069167 11.75 <.0001 
Enemy_numAgents 0.0221447 0.002397 9.24 <.0001 
MERS_numAgents -0.019179 0.002617 -7.33 <.0001 
Enemy_PK 0.0000881 0.000005 19.55 <.0001 
MERS_PK -0.000075 0.000004 -16.66 <.0001 
MERS_PD -0.000036 0.000004 -8.01 <.0001 
MERS_stealth -0.001423 0.000453 -3.14 0.0028 
(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152)*(MERS_stealth-51.2121) 0.0003225 0.00011 2.92 0.0051 
(MERS_PD-4509.09)*(MERS_stealth-51.2121) -5.114e-7 2.353e-7 -2.17 0.0344 
(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152)*(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152) -0.003155 0.000767 -4.11 0.0001 
(MERS_numAgents-15.0606)*(MERS_numAgents-15.0606) 0.0022467 0.000934 2.41 0.0197 
(Enemy_PK-4509.09)*(Enemy_PK-4509.09) -1.121e-8 2.954e-9 -3.80 0.0004 
(MERS_PK-4509.09)*(MERS_PK-4509.09) 5.6675e-9 2.874e-9 1.97 0.0540 
(MERS_PD-4509.09)*(MERS_PD-4509.09) 7.2386e-9 2.992e-9 2.42 0.0191 
 
Table 2.   Table displays the estimate of the regression 
coefficient for each term, the associated 
standard errors, the t-Statistic, and 
significance of the terms.  
 
The residuals of the fit should not display a pattern.  The 
full model displays this in its residual plot (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11.   Plot of the residuals from the full model.  
Note the lack of pattern (the desired result). 
 
The interaction plots provide insights into how each 
interaction will behave given defined values of the terms 















































































































































































Figure 12.   Interaction plots of the full model.  Note: 





 In the analysis of creating the best model that 
describes the data, the author took number of parameters 
into account as well.  Often models could be created that 
had minimal parameters and still exhibited adequate R 
Squared values.  For example, in the creation of the model 
for the response of Proportion of Friendly Casualties, the 
complete model with 14 parameters (main effects and 
interactions) has an R Squared of 0.9485.  Compare that 
result versus the 8 parameter model that has an R Squared 
of 0.9045 (Figure 13).  A model that has fewer parameters 
may be more interpretable, and just as statistically sound, 
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Figure 13.   Graph displays R Squared values vs. the number 
of parameters.  The knee in the curve occurs at 
the 8 parameter mark (0.9054).  The equation is 
the sample linear prediction for Proportion of 






The first term(s) that enter during the procedure are 
the interaction between survivability and lethality (with 
the main effects of each as well).  These terms produce an 
R Squared of 0.6654.  In further iterations of the 
algorithm, the interaction between survivability and 
lethality became insignificant and is removed.   
Evaluating the LSE output of the preferred model, it 
is observed that the terms included in the model are all 
highly significant, with the exception of the interaction 
between the number of MERS agents and the number of enemy 
agents (Significance level just below the 10% threshold at 




Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept 0.8361842 0.078373 10.67 <.0001
Enemy_numAgents 0.0183289 0.002663 6.88 <.0001
MERS_numAgents -0.01924 0.003357 -5.73 <.0001
Survivability 0.0000877 0.000006 15.19 <.0001
Lethality -0.000074 0.000006 -12.85 <.0001
Sensor Capability -0.000035 0.000006 -6.11 <.0001
(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152)*(MERS_numAgents-15.0606) 0.0014966 0.000904 1.65 0.1034
(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152)*(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152) -0.003052 0.000658 -4.64 <.0001
 
Table 3.   Table displays the estimate of the regression 
coefficient for each term, the associated 
standard errors, the t-Statistic, and 
significance of the terms. 
 
Another important aspect is the scatter of the 
residuals from the generated fit.  The residuals should 
display no defined pattern and they should be equally 
distributed above and below zero.  The desired pattern is 
often compared to a shotgun pattern; randomly distributed 
in the plot.  The residuals from the preferred fit 
generally display this desired characteristic (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14.   Plot displays the desired pattern of the 
residuals from the preferred fit.  The 
residuals are randomly distributed about the 
plot. 
 
The preferred fit also contains two interesting terms; 
MERS number of agents with Enemy number of agents and the 
quadratic interaction of Enemy number of agents (Figure 
15).  There is a diminishing return on Proportion of 
Friendly Casualties for both high and low numbers of MERS 
agents.  As the number of enemy agents increases, 
Proportion of Friendly Casualties increases until the range 
of 14 to 16 enemy agents.  Proportion of Friendly 
Casualties also exhibits high sensitivity when the ratio of 
the number of MERS agents to enemy agents is high.  For 
large numbers of enemy agents, Proportion of Friendly 





















































Figure 15.   Figure displays plot of interactions in the 
preferred fit.  Note; diminishing returns on 
the Proportion of Friendly Casualties are 
exhibited for both high and low levels of the 
number of MERS agents.  Also, the Proportion of 
Friendly Casualties is much more sensitive when 
the ratio of MERS agents to Enemy agents is 
high compared a lower ratio. 
 
Hand-in-hand with the Stepwise and LSE Regressions is 
the Partition or Regression Tree.  The results from the 
partition coincide with the results from the other 











































Term N Splits SS SS 
Enemy_numAgents 0 0  
MERS_numAgents 0 0  
Enemy_PK 1 2.15298097  
MERS_PK 1 1.26760749  
MERS_PD 0 0  
MERS_SA_DLY 0 0  
MERS_stealth 0 0  
MERS_shot_taken_duration 0 0  
MERS_shot_at_duration 0 0  
MERS_sqd_shot_at_duration 0 0  
 
Figure 16.   Charts display partition results on MOE of 
Proportion of Friendly Casualties.  Note that 
the first two levels of the partition graph 
that display the most significant factors are 
survivability (Enemy_PK) and lethality 
(MERS_PK).  The table displays the significance 
of the parameters based on the calculation of 
the split statistic. 
 
C. STATISTICAL FINDINGS 
The most significant finding is that no main effects 
show significance by themselves in the evaluation of LSE 
regression output for each MOE; the interactions 
(relationships between parameters in which changing a level 
of one has an effect on the other, resulting in an even 
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greater effect on the measure) are critical in explaining 
the MOEs better (main effects are included as terms if they 
are part of an interaction).  This highlights the need to 
evaluate the MERS as a system; simply evaluating the MERS 
by the modification of one parameter, one level at a time, 
will not allow for proper insights to be drawn.  This 
necessitates the intense evaluation of interaction plots in 
order to help interpret the results. 
Interactions are the most important factors to 
evaluate.  This is understandable in small unit combat— 
which needs to be evaluated as a system; there is no magic 
wand that can be produced or procured that can sway the 
battle.  The most important factors come in groups; one 
cannot have just a high PK, the need to be survivable as 
well creates the environment for success.  This is 
analogous to the triad of fire; there must be air, spark, 
and fuel present for fire to occur. 
 
D. STATISTICAL INSIGHTS 
1. Evaluation as a System 
A single parameter (main effect) will not have the 
ability to provide comprehensive insights into the MERS.  
The relationships between parameters are the most 
important.  This fact can be viewed in all evaluation of 
interactions.  Neglecting this could lead to incorrect 






2. Survivability and Lethality 
These two factors are the most important in the chosen 
scenario over the ranges examined (Figure 17).  In analysis 
of partition regression, survivability and lethality are 
the largest split statistic for each MOE (see IV. Data 
Analysis, A. Overview for discussion on the split 
statistic).  Survivability and lethality showing as the 
most significant parameters appeals to the intuitiveness of 
infantrymen; small units in close-in combat with no 







Figure 17.   Picture displays the significant parameters for 
each MOE by partition.  Note: Lethality and 
survivability (MERS and Enemy PKs) contribute 
the most to each partition (circled 
parameters).  Also, sensor capability (MERS_PD) 
and Situational Awareness (MERS_SA_DLY) showed 
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3. Mass is Still Significant 
Mass, or the number of MERS agents and the number of 
Enemy agents, is significant, especially in their 
interaction with other parameters. The number of agents 
impact the proportion of casualties inflicted on one 
another (Figure 18).  For large numbers of enemy (20), 
survivability has little effect on decreasing casualties.  
The biggest impact (reduction in casualties by 50%) occurs 
when the number of enemies is low and survivability is 
high.   
 
 
Figure 18.   Graph displays interaction between the number 
of enemy agents and survivability.  Note: As 
the survivability of the MERS increased, the 
percent MERS killed drops by nearly one half, 
when the number of enemy was small.  For large 
values of enemy, increasing the survivability 


























• Low survivability levels = low impact on 
casualties in presence of large number of enemies. 
• Mass overcomes survivability 
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Survivability has the biggest impact when paired with 
the number of MERS agents (Figure 19).  When survivability 
is low, the number of MERS agents has no effect in 
producing a good Exchange Ratio.  As the number of MERS 
agents increases, the Exchange Ratio becomes better.  For 
13 MERS agents (standard infantry squad), the Exchange 
Ratio is about 1 to 7 in favor of the MERS.  A unit that is 
not survivable will be less effective regardless of the 








Figure 19.   Graph displays interaction between 
survivability and the number of MERS agents.  
Note: The Exchange Ratio is maximized when 
there are many MERS agents with high 
survivability.  The number of agents has no 
impact on the Exchange Ratio when survivability 
is low.  For a standard Marine squad (13), the 
Exchange Ratio is about 1:7. 
 
The number of enemy forces has little effect on the 
accomplishment of the mission (Figure 20).  Survivability 
is the most important factor; high survivability levels act 
as a force multiplier overcoming the mass of the enemy.  
Following the right branch of the partition, high 
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Low survivability levels (High Enemy PK) 
have no effect on Exchange Ratio in 
presence of large numbers of MERS 
agents
Low survivability has no 
effect on Exchange Ratio 
as # MERS increases
At 13 agents, MERS has Exchange 
Ratio of about 1:7 with enemy, 
when survivability is high 
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fold increase in probability of mission completion.  When 
the MERS lethality values are about two and a half times 
the enemy’s values, the probability of mission completion 
is around 99% (bottom right branch of partition).  The 
worst results are seen when low survivability is paired 
with low lethality in the left branch of the partition (a 




Figure 20.   Graph displays partition of Friendly Mission 
Completion.  Note: High survivability will 
result in 8 times the probability of mission 
completion than low survivability.  When 
coupled with high lethality (about a 2:1 ratio) 
results in almost 99% mission completion.  The 



































































99% Mission Completion 
when lethality and 
survivability are high! 
When Survivability is 
high, by itself, probability 




Partition of Probability of Friendly Mission 
Completion displaying importance of high 
survivability levels (Low Enemy PK)
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4. Lack of Significance of Situational Awareness  
In this scenario, Situational Awareness (SA) does not 
show significance by itself, but in some interactions 
proves very important (Figure 21, Figure 22).  Increasing 
the number of MERS agents allows for an increase in mission 
completion when communication delays are both long (5 
minutes) and short (zero), but both delays show diminishing 
returns.  Computer models have the ability to process much 
more information than the individual combatant, but 
evaluating the delay of this processing (SA sharing) may 
highlight an example of information overload.  This is 
present especially when the SA sharing delay is 5 minutes.  
There is some value to having networked, perfect 
information sharing structure that results in higher 
probability of mission completion.  SA sharing shows less 
significance than other parameters because: 
• Combat takes place at such short ranges 
• There is so much ambiguity in the friend-or-foe 
evaluation, that by the time SA is shared, the 










Figure 21.   Graph displays interaction between number of 
MERS agents and SA delay.  Note: For high 
values of delay (150 steps = 5 min), there is a 
diminishing return as the number of MERS agents 
increases.  There is a point of SA overload, 
where the probability of mission completion 
suffers regardless of delay length.  For low 
delay (0 steps), the number of agents increases 
mission completion success.  This is due to the 
fact that more agents equates to more eyes to 
identify the enemy.  Once a MERS agent 
identifies an enemy, the rest of the squad can 
orient and attack. 
0
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High SA delay exhibit diminishing returns 
in the presence of large numbers of 
MERS agents 
SA overload point, 





Figure 22.   Graph displays interaction between SA delay and 
number of Enemy agents.  Note: For large values 
of delay (150 steps = 5 min), increased numbers 
of enemy led to increased length of mission.  
Low delay values lead to a minor effect when 



























Large SA delay values lead to longer 
mission length, in the presence of 
large numbers of enemy 
Large SA sharing delay 
coupled with large 
numbers of enemy, led 
to longer mission times
SA overload occurs 
when # of enemy 
increases, regardless 
of delay time 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. MERS Effectiveness and Employment 
• Evaluation of the MERS must be done as a system.  
The interactions between parameters require a 
system approach be applied.   
• Employing weapons and equipment that provide the 
most lethal and survivable unit will ensure the 
most effective MERS.  Lethality should be viewed 
as the MERS ability to project combat power; 
e.g., weaponry.  Survivability should be viewed 
as anything that can defeat the enemy’s 
projection of combat power; e.g., body armor, 
camouflage, or in today’s networked world, even 
electronic countermeasures.  It is important to 
note that increasing lethality and survivability 
cannot be accomplished piecemeal (evident from 










• The tradeoff between mass and SA sharing must be 
closely examined.  The MERS should be employed as 
large a force as possible that does not interfere 
with the mission.  Mass allows the MERS to defeat 
enemy formations.  Effective SA sharing in the 
presence of a larger unit can be problematic.  
There was a diminishing return of mission 
completion as the unit grew, most likely due to 
SA overload.  It is the author’s experience that 
the more members of a unit focus on information 
being relayed to them, vice focusing on the 
situation themselves, results in a less effective 
unit. 
 
2. Agent-based Modeling as an Analysis Tool 
The future application of agent-based modeling as an 
analysis tool is unlimited.  As the modeling needs of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) become greater, one can count 
on the quality of agent models to improve.  Likewise, the 
culture of modelers in DoD will begin to be more receptive 
to the use of agent-based models.  This sets the stage for 
first class analysis that utilizes all of the tools 
available.  
An important principle for the use of agent-based 
models is the fact that this set of models is intended to 
compliment the suite of physics-based models.  The Army has 
shown that use of agent- and physics-based models in 
concert will benefit the modeling process in whole (Cioppa, 
2002).  To that end, the author believes it is important  
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for DoD to integrate agent-based models into its analysis.  
The addition of agent-based models will add to the 
robustness of current research efforts.  
 
3. Further Research and Analysis 
All employment and structure recommendations are, of 
course, limited to the context of this scenario.  That 
being said, the seeds are planted for further research to 
be conducted.  The surface of research and analysis has 
only been scratched in this scenario.  The research and 
analysis has explored a specific scenario with a specific 
environment.  In order to add to the robustness of the 
analysis, it is vital to explore differing terrains and 
mission profiles.   
The addition of different mission profiles and support 
packages is important as well.  An IDF scenario has been 
examined only basically and needs more in depth analysis.  
The author suggests the exploration of support of some 
inorganic sensor unit (UAV, reconnaissance team, sniper, 
etc.).   
Based on some Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 
experiments utilizing a squad designated marksman (DM) 
(Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2000), an evaluation 
of the effect of an added DM in the MERS could be 
beneficial.  A trade-off analysis of equipping and training 
the entire MERS to perform the DM mission versus the 





Scaling of the scenario into next level units will add 
insight into the addition of external asset needs versus 
small unit capabilities.  The addition of some eye-in-the-
sky or an on station air-to-ground asset may mitigate the 
need for the individual to have a high PK. 
 
B. ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS 
1. Force 
Overall, the number of Marines that would be a part of 
the MERS makes little statistical impact.  When the 
parameter is influential (such as in producing a higher 
proportion of enemy casualties), the trend is to recommend 
larger numbers of Marines.  This follows the reasoning of 
the concept of mass; the number of rifles in the fight can 
still make the difference. 
On the enemy side, similar trends are observed.  
Larger enemy units are able to affect the fight more often 
(such as in producing a higher proportion of friendly 
casualties, increasing the length of a mission, and 
decreasing the probability of mission completion).  It 
would be interesting to be able to evaluate a metric based 
on the size of enemy involved in each contact.  The author 
observed many times that a larger, concentrated enemy force 
produced more casualties.  This may be observed through 
further modeling of a scripted enemy force that is 
stationary and changes in size or, by adjusting the enemy 
behaviors to be more inclined to mass.  As for the friendly 






Fire and maneuver is still king in small unit combat.  
The basic principles of fixing the enemy with fires, and 
then moving to engage their weakness hold true (see FMFM 6-
5 Marine Rifle Squad, page 2-31).  This successful 
technique was usually observed through hundreds of 
replications of the scenario. 
The use of indirect fires in order to gain superiority 
over the enemy is vital in the indirect fire (IDF) 
scenario.  A well supported small unit has the ability to 
overcome a much larger force.  This allows for economy of 




In evaluation of the scenarios modeled, it is obvious 
that the terrain is an important factor.  Urban terrain is 
an environment that is ruthless, even to computer 
combatants.  The lack of LOS, adequate maneuverability, and 
the occurrence of close-in combat can overwhelm the unit.  
This is an area which translated well in real-world-to-
model.  The urban battlefield negated complex and advanced 
communication capabilities and sensor effects, limited 
maneuver, and reduced stand-off from the enemy, resulting 
in a more deadly environment.   
Given the LOS based sensors, it would be desirable to 
develop a sensor that provided better capabilities in an 
urban environment.  Firefights are most often reactive due 
to the limited detection ability of the MERS.  The combat 
is characterized by the MERS essentially stumbling into an  
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enemy force and then utilizing fire and maneuver to destroy 
them.  Further modeling should be explored in which the 
100% concealment values of the buildings could be varied in 
order to evaluate some sensor that can overcome walls.   
 
4. Emergent Behavior 
One of the most interesting effects of using an agent-
based model is the experience of emergent behavior (“the 
process of complex pattern formation from simpler rules” 
(Wikipedia, 2005)).  This occurs when the agents modeled 
make decisions based on behavioral rules vice scripting.  
The more accurately the behaviors are developed, the more 
accurate the emergent behavior becomes.   
The primary scenario modeled, along with the Indirect 
Fire (IDF) scenario excursion, both exhibited emergent 
behavior.  In the base scenario, the MERS exhibited 
emergent behavior during firefights with the insurgent 
forces.  Most often, the firefight began with the front of 
the MERS column being engaged by an insurgent force.  This 
led to several state changes of the agents in the squad.  
Through these state changes and associated behaviors, the 
agents in the rear of the MERS column would essentially 
find cover, and then begin to maneuver on the insurgent 
force (commonly resulting in traditional flanking or double 
envelopments), based on their defined behaviors.  There was 
no scripting for the agents to follow; the agents used 
their defined behaviors, resulting in the flank maneuver.   
In the IDF scenario, the MERS exhibited the same small 
unit firefight behavior.  An interesting example of 
emergent behavior occurred when the MERS was able to 
utilize IDF to engage the enemy.  IDF was available to the 
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MERS during the entire scenario (except during ‘out-of-
action’ time between shots), yet the MERS seemed only to 
utilize the IDF when faced with an enemy they could not 
quickly dispatch.  For example, as the MERS came into 
contact with a small (say < 4) enemy, they would usually 
easily destroy the enemy force without IDF.  As the enemy 
force began to compare in size to the MERS, more protracted 
firefights would occur.  These longer firefights would 
result in the MERS utilizing their IDF to gain an advantage 
on the enemy due to the delay in accomplishing the mission.  
There was no interaction of the modeler to base IDF usage 
on force ratio, enemy size, or time of firefight.  The MERS 
agents evaluated the situation and, based on the predefined 
behaviors, utilized IDF.   
Of course, even these simple examples may seem 
farfetched.  Currently, it is impossible to capture this 
emergent behavior via some metric.  MANA enables the 
modeler to view a well developed animated run of the 
scenario.  The author asserts the existence of emergent 
behavior based on the thousands of runs he has viewed.  The 
development of a metric would aid in the validation of 
emergent behavior, enabling a better understanding of this 










 Small unit combat necessitates the evaluation of 
interactions in order to gain insights into improving unit 
effectiveness.  This highlights the need for evaluation of 
the MERS as a system.   
 The individual combatant is both the most fragile and 
most sturdy of units in warfare.  They have the ability to 
neutralize forces that are larger, stronger, and more 
lethal.  They can also be destroyed by the simplest of 
means.  This fact serves to highlight the need for 
increased lethality and survivability.  As the 
transformation of the American Armed Forces heads forward, 
the rift between those who believe in investment in 
individuals and those who believe in investment in material 
grows larger.   
 One thing will always be true; at the end of the day, 
it is the individual Marine, Soldier, Sailor, and Airman 
that affect the fight more than any system.  Investment in 
improving the method that these individuals complete the 
mission is always advisable.  This research has shown that 
focusing efforts in some key areas, lethality and 
survivability, while evaluating the relationship between 
them, can lead to overall mission success; kill the enemy, 





APPENDIX A. PARTITION GRAPHS 
The partition graphs display the series of splits 
executed, based on the size of the split statistic (see IV. 
Data Analysis, A. Overview for discussion on the split 
statistic).  In order to interpret the graph, begin at the 
top center (the root) and follow the subsequent splits to 
identify the most significant parameters.  The numerical 
values displayed are the level at which the previous 
parameter was split.  In this set up, the most significant 
parameters begin with the root, and follow down the graph 
in order of significance.  The values displayed are 
relative levels that the partition found the split 

















A. PROBABILITY OF FRIENDLY MISSION COMPLETION 
 
The root displays the most significant factor as 
survivability.  The next level displays lethality as the 
second most significant factor.  Note: Situational 

















































B. PROPORTION OF FRIENDLY CASUALTIES 
 
The root displays the most significant factor as 
survivability.  The next level displays lethality as the 
second most significant factor.  Note: Situational 
Awareness is not a significant factor at all.  Enemy mass 



















































C. PROPORTION OF ENEMY CASUALTIES 
 
The root displays the most significant factor as 
survivability.  The next level displays lethality as the 
second most significant factor.  Note: Situational 




















































D. EXCHANGE RATIO 
 
The root displays the most significant factor as 
survivability.  The next level displays lethality as the 
second most significant factor.  Note: Situational 
Awareness is not a significant factor at all.  Enemy mass 









































E. TIME TO MISSION COMPLETION 
 
The root displays the most significant factor as 
lethality.  The next level displays survivability as the 
second most significant factor.  Note: Situational 
Awareness is not a significant factor at all.  Enemy mass 





















































































1 20 14 1700 7100 5400 30 90 15 150 105
2 19 11 8000 4300 2300 60 80 10 135 75
3 18 20 4100 1200 5200 30 80 2 60 150
4 13 21 7100 7600 2100 60 60 3 75 30
5 19 15 1200 5800 6000 30 90 17 30 30
6 20 13 7600 4100 2500 45 90 26 15 90
7 15 21 4300 1000 5600 45 70 27 135 15
8 13 20 5800 7300 2800 45 50 30 90 135
9 15 12 2800 6000 3200 75 60 6 90 90
10 16 12 5600 2500 4700 105 70 12 135 45
11 16 18 2500 3400 1400 150 70 6 60 105
12 17 17 6000 6300 7800 135 70 13 45 30
13 14 11 2100 5200 1900 90 60 24 60 60
14 18 14 5200 2100 4900 135 80 22 45 120
15 14 19 2300 3600 1000 135 60 23 105 60
16 17 16 5400 6700 7300 150 80 20 120 120
17 13 15 4500 4500 4500 75 50 16 90 90
18 5 16 7300 1900 3600 120 10 16 15 60
19 6 20 1000 4700 6700 90 20 21 30 90
20 7 10 4900 7800 3800 120 20 29 105 15
21 12 9 1900 1400 6900 90 50 28 90 135
22 6 15 7800 3200 3000 120 20 14 135 135
23 5 17 1400 4900 6500 105 10 5 150 75
24 10 9 4700 8000 3400 120 40 4 30 150
25 12 10 3200 1700 6300 105 50 1 75 30
26 10 18 6300 3000 5800 75 40 25 75 75
27 9 18 3400 6500 4300 45 30 19 30 120
28 9 12 6500 5600 7600 0 30 25 105 60
29 8 13 3000 2800 1200 15 30 18 120 135
30 11 19 6900 3800 7100 60 40 7 105 105
31 7 17 3800 6900 4100 15 20 9 120 45
32 11 11 6700 5400 8000 15 40 8 60 105




Table 4.   Tables display the DOE evaluated.  Note: PKs and 
PD are coded for MANA; e.g., dividing the value 
by 10,000 produces a traditional PK between 0 
and 1 (5000 / 10000 = 0.5).  SA Delay and the 
other duration parameters are coded as well.  
The value listed is time steps.  One time step 

























34 14 17 4500 8000 6000 150 20 20 45 135
35 8 18 3000 7500 4000 140 90 7 60 75
36 14 18 1000 3000 8000 130 50 41 30 15
37 7 19 1500 4000 1500 80 80 45 75 135
38 16 14 5000 1500 2000 140 10 22 45 105
39 8 11 7000 1000 4500 150 90 15 60 75
40 15 14 7500 7000 1000 100 50 44 45 15
41 9 12 8000 4500 7500 80 70 42 60 135
42 10 9 2500 5000 5000 100 30 11 90 105
43 13 10 3500 7000 2500 110 60 13 105 45
44 6 11 2000 3500 5500 110 30 34 150 60
45 20 15 4000 2500 2000 120 70 30 135 120
46 7 21 6500 3500 3000 90 20 9 90 90
47 13 20 6000 3000 6500 130 60 18 135 30
48 5 17 6500 6000 3500 90 30 38 135 60
49 19 16 5500 6500 6500 120 60 27 150 120
50 13 15 4500 4500 4500 80 50 23 90 90
51 11 13 4500 1000 3000 0 80 26 120 30
52 17 12 6000 1500 5000 10 10 40 105 90
53 11 12 8000 6000 1000 20 60 5 135 150
54 18 11 7500 5000 7500 70 20 1 90 30
55 9 16 4000 7500 7000 10 90 24 120 60
56 17 19 2000 8000 4500 0 20 31 105 90
57 10 17 1500 2000 8000 50 50 2 120 150
58 16 18 1000 4500 1500 70 40 4 105 30
59 15 21 6500 4000 4000 50 70 35 75 60
60 12 20 5500 2000 6500 40 40 33 60 120
61 19 20 7000 5500 3500 40 70 12 15 105
62 5 15 5000 6500 7000 30 30 16 30 45
63 18 9 2500 5500 6000 60 80 37 75 75
64 12 10 3000 6500 2500 20 40 29 30 135
65 20 13 3000 3000 5500 60 80 8 30 105
66 6 14 3500 2500 3000 30 40 19 15 45
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APPENDIX C. LINEAR REGRESSION EXAMPLE 
A. FULL MODEL REGRESSION: PROPORTION OF FRIENDLY 
CASUALTIES 























Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.948545 
RSquare Adj 0.935681 
Root Mean Square Error 0.076481 
Mean of Response 0.614596 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 66 
 
The amount of explained variation in the model is 
0.9485 with a model variance of 0.076 (a very good fit). 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept 0.812676 0.069167 11.75 <.0001
Enemy_numAgents 0.0221447 0.002397 9.24 <.0001
MERS_numAgents -0.019179 0.002617 -7.33 <.0001
Enemy_PK 0.0000881 0.000005 19.55 <.0001
MERS_PK -0.000075 0.000004 -16.66 <.0001
MERS_PD -0.000036 0.000004 -8.01 <.0001
MERS_stealth -0.001423 0.000453 -3.14 0.0028
(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152)*(MERS_stealth-51.2121) 0.0003225 0.00011 2.92 0.0051
(MERS_PD-4509.09)*(MERS_stealth-51.2121) -5.114e-7 2.353e-7 -2.17 0.0344
(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152)*(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152) -0.003155 0.000767 -4.11 0.0001
(MERS_numAgents-15.0606)*(MERS_numAgents-15.0606) 0.0022467 0.000934 2.41 0.0197
(Enemy_PK-4509.09)*(Enemy_PK-4509.09) -1.121e-8 2.954e-9 -3.80 0.0004
(MERS_PK-4509.09)*(MERS_PK-4509.09) 5.6675e-9 2.874e-9 1.97 0.0540
(MERS_PD-4509.09)*(MERS_PD-4509.09) 7.2386e-9 2.992e-9 2.42 0.0191
Note: all included main effects are significant at the 
0.05 level. 
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Terms with an interaction are solid lines. 
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B. PREFERRED MODEL: PROPORTION OF FRIENDLY CASUALTIES 
See IV. Data Analysis, B. Methodology Example: 
Proportion of Friendly Casualties for a more in depth 
explanation. 
 


























Root Mean Square Error 0.098184
Mean of Response 0.614596
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 66
 
The amount of explained variation in the model is 
0.9054 with a model variance of 0.098 (a very good fit). 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept 0.8361842 0.078373 10.67 <.0001
Enemy_numAgents 0.0183289 0.002663 6.88 <.0001
MERS_numAgents -0.01924 0.003357 -5.73 <.0001
Enemy_PK 0.0000877 0.000006 15.19 <.0001
MERS_PK -0.000074 0.000006 -12.85 <.0001
MERS_PD -0.000035 0.000006 -6.11 <.0001
(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152)*(MERS_numAgents-15.0606) 0.0014966 0.000904 1.65 0.1034
(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152)*(Enemy_numAgents-12.5152) -0.003052 0.000658 -4.64 <.0001
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This model only contains the interactions between MERS 
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APPENDIX D. MANA SCENARIO SETTINGS 
The scenario settings below are in order to establish 
the base scenario with the initial starting conditions.  It 
should be noted that the actual parameter values utilized 
varied widely (see Appendix C. Designs of Experiment).  Any 
values that are missing or parameter not listed should be 











Start state and Default fallback state
3
Taken Shot (Pri) 
10 (interrupter)
Spare 1
Agent state when agent has fired its primary weapon at an enemy (may not have hit target)
5
Shot At (Pri) 
10




Taken Shot (Pri)Left empty for use as intermediate fallback states
1
Default State 
Start state and Default fallback state
29
Refuel by Enemy 
150
Default
Agent state while being refuelled by an enemy
30
Refuel By Friend 
150
Default
Agent state while being refuelled by a friend
31
Refuel By Neutral 
150
Default
Agent state while being refuelled by a neutral
1
Default State 
Start state and Default fallback state
3
Taken Shot (Pri) 
3
Default
Agent state when agent has fired its primary weapon at an enemy (may not have hit target)
5
Shot At (Pri) 
30
Default
Agent state when shot at by an enemy’s primary weapon (may not have been hit)
13
Squad Shot At (Pri) 
30 (Can't interrupt)
Default







































Max Target Threat Level
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